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This paper considers a scoring auction used in procurement. In this auction,
each supplier oﬀers both price and quality, and a supplier whose oﬀer achieves
the highest score wins. The environment we consider has two features: the buyer
has private information and quality is multi-dimensional. We show that a scoring
auction implements the ex ante optimal mechanism for the buyer when the value
complementarity between quality attributes is suﬃciently greater than the cost
substitutability. We further show how the buyer should design scoring rules.
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11 Introduction
Auction rules of public procurement have changed from single-dimensional bidding to
multi-dimensional bidding. The procurement authorities have conventionally adopted
price-only auctions, in which the authorities award procurement contracts based only
on contractors’ price-bids. A weakness of price-only auction is that the procurement
authority prespeciﬁes the quality level of product, which does not reﬂect technological
information held by contractors. As an alternative rule, a scoring auction becomes in-
creasingly popular. In this auction, each contractor oﬀers both price and quality, and
these oﬀers are evaluated using a scoring rule announced by the authority. This auc-
tion allows the authority to choose the winner based not only on price-bids but also on
quality-bids. In 2004, the European Union adopted a new public procurement directive,
which, in eﬀect, mandates the use of scoring auctions (Asker and Cantillon, 2008).
How eﬀectively does a scoring auction work? How should the procurement authority
design a scoring rule? They are a matter of great concern to the authorities because
public projects have signiﬁcant impact on society. There are, however, some diﬃculty in
designing a scoring rule. For instance, consider the construction of a bridge. The author-
ity should care about many attributes of the project such as building materials, a method
of construction, a time for completion, and so on. Moreover, although each contractor
has technological information, the authority may possess superior information about the
value of each attribute. These issues render the design of scoring rule complicate.
The previous studies have conﬁrmed the high performance of a scoring auction for
the buyer. A common feature of these models is that a buyer procures a single product
diﬀerentiated by its quality from one of suppliers, who have private information about
production costs. In a seminal article, Che (1993) shows that a scoring auction with a
2properly designed scoring rule implements the buyer’s optimal mechanism (characterized
by Laﬀont and Tirole (1987)). Branco (1997) extends this result to an environment
where each supplier’s production cost has a common-cost component, so that his cost is
correlated with the other suppliers’ costs. Asker and Cantillon (2008) consider a fully
general environment where both the supplier’s type and quality are multi-dimensional,
and the buyer also has private information about her taste for quality. Although their
main results are the characterization of equilibrium bidding behavior and the expected
utility equivalence theorem, they also show that the scoring auction outperforms some
other mechanisms including a price-only auction. On the other hand, they have not
examined whether a scoring auction implements the optimal outcome for the buyer. The
main reason is that it is extremely diﬃcult to characterize the optimal mechanism when
the supplier has multi-dimensional private information. However, Asker and Cantillon
(2010) characterize the optimal mechanism in a speciﬁc environment where each supplier’s
type consists of two parameters (ﬁxed cost and marginal cost) and each parameter is a
binary random variable. They show that the scoring auction yields a performance close to
that of the optimal mechanism, taking a numerical simulation approach. In addition to
these theoretical studies, there is experimental evidence supporting the high performance
of scoring auction compared to that of price-only auction (Bichler, 2000; Chen-Ritzo,
2005).
As explained above, it is an important research question whether a scoring auction,
which becomes increasingly prevalent in practice, implements the optimal outcome for
the buyer. This paper shows that the positive result of Che (1993) can be extended to an
environment where the buyer has private information, and quality is multi-dimensional.
We assume that each supplier’s type is single-dimensional because Asker and Cantillon
3(2010) have already obtained the negative result (i.e. a scoring auction cannot implement
the optimal mechanism) in an environment where the supplier’s type is two-dimensional.
We proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the ex ante optimal mechanism for the
buyer, following the approach in the informed-principal literature; see Myerson (1983),
Maskin and Tirole (1990), Tan (1996), and Mylovanov and Tr¨ oger (2008). Second, we
show that a scoring auction implements the ex ante optimal mechanism. We then char-
acterize the optimal scoring rules, and discuss some problems of scoring rules used in
practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium bidding strategy. Section 4 shows that a scoring auction
implements the ex ante optimal mechanism. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a buyer who procures a single product from one of N suppliers. A (production)
contract between the buyer and a supplier i ∈ {1,...,N} is denoted by (pi,qi) ∈ R+ ×Q,
under which the supplier i must deliver a product of quality qi = (q1
i,...,qM
i ) ∈ Q ≡
∏M
m=1[0, ¯ qm] in exchange for price pi ∈ R+; for m ∈ {1,...,M}, each qm
i represents a non-
monetary attribute.1 The buyer’s taste parameter for quality is given by t ∈ [t,¯ t] ⊂ R,
and the supplier i’s cost parameter for quality by θi ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] ⊂ R. These players’ types
t and  = (θ1,...,θN) are random variables which are independent across players. The
cumulative distribution function of t is given by G. The cumulative distribution function
1In this paper, bold letters denote some vectors. We say that q ≥ ^ q if qm ≥ ˆ qm for all m, and q ≫ ^ q
if qm > ˆ qm for all m.
4of θi is given by F, with a density function f that is continuous and strictly positive
everywhere. Each player has private information about the realized type respectively,
but the prior probability distributions are common knowledge.
The buyer of type t obtains utility v(q,t) − p from a contract (p,q), where v(q,t) is
her valuation for a product of quality q. The supplier i of type θi earns proﬁts p−c(q,θi)
from a contract (p,q), where c(q,θi) is his production cost. We assume that v and c
are three times continuously diﬀerentiable in all arguments. We also make the following
assumptions.2
Assumption 1. vm > 0,cm > 0, for all m.
Assumption 2. vt > 0,vmt > 0, for all m.
Assumption 3. cθ > 0,cmθ > 0, for all m.
Assumption 4. c and cm are weakly convex in θ, for all m.
Assumption 5. F
f is increasing in θ.
Assumptions 3, 4, and 5 ensure that the function of “virtual surplus” has strictly
decreasing diﬀerences in (q,θ).
There is an auction rule (mechanism) that is feasible for the buyer: a scoring auction.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a scoring rule as S : R+ × Q → R ∪ {−∞}. In a scoring auction, each
supplier oﬀers both price and quality, and the function S assigns a score S(p,q) to each
price-quality pair (p,q). One can interpret this real-valued function as representing a
preference relation over price-quality pairs. We assume that S is continuous in (p,q)
such that S(p,q) > −∞. The buyer can set a reserve score, which is normalized to zero.
Then, a supplier i wins only if his score is nonnegative and the highest among suppliers.3
2Subscripts denote partial derivatives, i.e. vt = @v=@t;vm = @v=@qm;vmm′ = @2v=@qm@qm
′
. We say
that vm > 0 if vm(q;t) > 0 for all q;t. We use the same notation for other functions.
3We assume that if there is a tie, then each supplier achieving the nonnegative highest score wins
with equal probability. All results hold for any other tie-breaking rule.
5We consider a ﬁrst-score (sealed-bid) format, in which the winner i is awarded a binding
contract (pi,qi) he oﬀered in the auction; the ﬁrst-score format corresponds to a ﬁrst-
price format in a standard price-only auction. We focus on a quasi-linear scoring rule S,
in which the function takes a form of S(p,q) = s(q) − p. It will be shown in Section 4
that a scoring auction with properly designed quasi-linear rules implements the optimal
mechanism for the buyer. Let S ≡ {S | S is quasi-linear} be the set of feasible scoring
rules.
The auction game proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, all players’ types (,t)
are realized, and the players are privately informed about their own types respectively.
In the second stage, the buyer publicly announces a scoring rule S ∈ S. In the third
stage, each supplier i simultaneously and independently submits an oﬀer (pi,qi). Then,
the game ends. When a supplier i of type θi who oﬀers (pi,qi) such that S(pi,qi) =
maxj S(pj,qj) ≥ 0 wins, he receives pi−c(qi,θi), the other suppliers receive zero payoﬀs,
and the buyer of type t receives v(qi,t) − pi. When no supplier wins, all players receive
zero payoﬀs.
In the following sections, we explore the (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the game. The buyer’s strategy is a choice of auction rule S, depending on her type
t. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote a supplier i’s bidding strategy by (pi,qi) :
[θ, ¯ θ] × S → R+ × Q. A supplier i’s posterior belief about the buyer’s type conditional
on the announced rule S is denoted by the cumulative distribution function GS
i on [t,¯ t].
Because the players’ types are independent, no supplier updates his belief about the other
suppliers’ types in equilibrium; we also assume that this is the case in any oﬀ-equilibrium
path.
We ﬁnally identify the ex post eﬃcient outcome: Given the realized types (,t), a
6supplier with the lowest type θi among  = (θ1,...,θN) wins the auction, and delivers a
product of the eﬃcient quality level ~ q(θi,t) ∈ argmaxq∈Q[v(q,t) − c(q,θi)] to the buyer.
We assume that v(~ q(¯ θ,t),t) − c(~ q(¯ θ,t), ¯ θ) ≥ 0.
3 Equilibrium bidding strategy
In this section, we derive the equilibrium bidding strategy.
Note that a supplier’s belief GS
i about the buyer’s type is irrelevant to his bidding
behavior; all that matters is the scoring rule S announced by the buyer. This is due to
the following two facts. First, the outcome is completely determined by the suppliers’
bids, so that the buyer with full commitment power has no chance to aﬀect the outcome
after her announcement of the rule. Second, we consider a private-values environment,
in which the suppliers’ production costs are independent of the buyer’s type.
The following lemma characterizes a symmetric equilibrium in the auction, where
all suppliers use the same bidding strategy. We assume that no supplier uses weakly
dominated strategies. Then, we apply the technique of Che (1993) to prove this lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) For any scoring rule S, there exists a symmetric equilibrium with a cost
parameter ¯ θS in which the bidding strategy (p∗,q∗) is determined by the following condi-

















and for all θ ∈ (¯ θS, ¯ θ], (p∗(θ,S),q∗(θ,S)) is an arbitrary one which satisﬁes S(p∗(θ,S),q∗(θ,S)) <
0. (ii) In the above equilibrium, a supplier wins only if his cost parameter is the lowest
among (θ1,...,θN) and lower than ¯ θS.
7Using a reserve score, the buyer can eﬀectively exclude some suppliers who are more
ineﬃcient than a critical type ¯ θS. On the other hand, the equilibrium price oﬀer may
not be increasing in θ. This fact implies that a scoring auction with a reserve “price”
(not reserve score) may be problematic to the buyer. We will discuss the issue after
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium the most eﬃcient supplier wins provided that
his type is lower than ¯ θS. Let θ(N) ≡ min{θ1,...,θN} be the lowest cost parameter (ﬁrst-
order statistic), which is also a random variable. We denote the cumulative distribution
function and the probability density function of θ(N) by F(N)(θ) = 1 − (1 − F(θ))N and
f(N)(θ) = N(1 − F(θ))N−1f(θ) respectively. Then, the buyer of type t’s expected utility
from announcing a scoring rule S is4



















the second equality follows from the substitution of p∗(θ(N),S) and the interchange of
the integrals. We now deﬁne the virtual surplus as the function Φ(q,θ,t) ≡ v(q,t) −
c(q,θ) − cθ(q,θ)
F(θ)
f(θ). Its value Φ(q,θ,t) is the social surplus generated by trading a
product of quality q between the buyer of type t and a supplier of type θ, minus the sum
of information rents paid to the more eﬃcient supplier than θ. Using this virtual surplus,
the buyer of type t’s expected utility can be rewritten as





4In this paper, EY [·] represents the expectation operator with respect to the prior distributions of
random variables Y .
8When θi ≤ ¯ θS, a supplier of type θi’s expected proﬁt in the auction is given by










When θi > ¯ θS, a supplier of type θi’s proﬁt is zero because his score is negative.
4 Implementation
In this section, we consider the implementation problem. The analysis proceeds in two
steps. First, we characterize the optimal mechanism for the buyer, following the approach
in the informed-principal literature; see Myerson (1983), Tan (1996), and Mylovanov and
Tr¨ oger (2008). Second, we examine the implementation of the optimal mechanism via a
scoring auction.
In a ﬁrst step, we begin by considering the following mechanism-selection game. This
hypothetical game diﬀers from the auction game in Section 2 only in that the buyer is
allowed to use any arbitrary mechanism which satisﬁes individual rationality. After the
players know their realized types in the ﬁrst stage, the buyer announces a general mech-
anism in the second stage. In the third stage, each player (possibly including the buyer)
simultaneously and independently reports a message from the message space speciﬁed by
the mechanism; a message space must include a disagreement option which ensures zero
payoﬀ for each player.
We introduce some deﬁnitions. A direct mechanism is an N-tuple of measurable
functions ρ = (ρ1,...,ρN) where ρi = (Pi,Qi,Xi) : [θ, ¯ θ]N × [t,¯ t] → R × Q × [0,1]. For
each proﬁle of reported types (,t), a transfer schedule Pi(,t) speciﬁes the expected
monetary transfer from the buyer to the supplier i, a quality schedule Qi(,t) speciﬁes
9the quality level the supplier i must achieve when delivering the product, and Xi(,t)










ρ(t | t) ≥ U
ρ(ˆ t | t) for all t,ˆ t ∈ [t,¯ t] (1)
Π
ρ
i(θi | θi) ≥ Π
ρ
i(ˆ θi | θi) for all θi, ˆ θi ∈ [θ, ¯ θ],i ∈ {1,...N} (2)
Π
ρ
i(θi | θi) ≥ 0 for all θi ∈ [θ, ¯ θ],i ∈ {1,...N} (3)
N ∑
i=1
Xi(,t) ≤ 1 for all  ∈ [θ, ¯ θ]
N,t ∈ [t,¯ t], (4)
where
U
ρ(ˆ t | t) =
N ∑
i=1
E[Xi(,ˆ t) · v(Qi(,ˆ t),t) − Pi(,ˆ t)]
Π
ρ
i(ˆ θi | θi) =
∫  t
t
E i[Pi(ˆ θi,−i,t) − Xi(ˆ θi,−i,t) · c(Qi(ˆ θi,−i,t),θi)]dG(t).
The ﬁrst constraint is an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint for the buyer, the second
one is an IC constraint for each supplier, the third one is an individual rationality (IR)
constraint for each supplier, and the fourth one is a condition for the trading probability.
Using the “Revelation Principle” and “Inscrutability Principle” of Myerson (1983), we
can focus on this particular mechanism (P ∗
i ,Q∗
i,X∗
i )i∈{1,...,N} when ﬁnding the equilibrium
outcome in the mechanism-selection game that yields the highest ex ante utility for the
buyer. Note that in a supplier’s expected proﬁt Π
ρ
i(ˆ θi | θi), the expectation for the buyer’s
type is taken with respect to the prior belief G, which implies that the announcement
of a mechanism ρ conveys no information about the buyer’s type. For any separation
equilibrium in which some types of the buyer announce diﬀerent mechanisms, we can ﬁnd
a pooling equilibrium which is outcome-equivalent to the original equilibrium. This is
just an argument of the Inscrutability Principle.
10The next lemma characterizes the ex ante optimal mechanism. We deﬁne K ≡
max
q,m,m′,θ
cmm′θ(q,θ)F(θ)/f(θ). The proof is based on Mylovanov and Tr¨ oger (2008).
Lemma 2. Suppose that vmm′(q,t)−cmm′(q,θ) ≥ K, for all m ̸= m′. Then, the following
direct mechanism (P ∗
i ,Q∗
i,X∗





      
      
1 if θi < min{θ1,...,θi−1,θi+1,...,θN, ¯ θt∗}
1
♯{j|θj=θi} if θi = min{θ1,...,θi−1,θi+1,...,θN, ¯ θt∗}


























where ¯ θt∗ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] is a cost parameter such that Φ(Q∗(θ,t),θ,t) ≥ 0 iﬀ θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θt∗].
The ex ante optimal mechanism coincides with the mechanism that would be optimal
if the buyer’s type were common knowledge. This is the “irrelevance result”, which holds
in many independent-private-values environments where the principal (buyer) has a quasi-
linear preference (Maskin and Tirole (1990), Tan (1996)). In a more general environment,
Mylovanov and Tr¨ oger (2008) provide a condition under which the irrelevance result holds.
The following lemma characterizes the optimal quality schedule Q∗(θ,t) in Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. (i) Q∗(θ,t) ≥ Q∗(θ′,t) for all θ < θ′, t ∈ [t,¯ t]. (ii) Q∗(θ,t), ~ q(θ,t) ∈
argmaxq[v(q,t) − c(q,θ)] for all t ∈ [t,¯ t]. (iii) Suppose that v − c is supermodular in q.
Then, Q∗(θ,t) ≪ ~ q(θ,t) for all θ ∈ (θ, ¯ θ], t ∈ [t,¯ t].
This lemma has some important implications for the implementation possibilities.
First, the part (i) states that the optimal schedule Qm∗(θ,t) of non-monetary attribute
is nonincreasing in θ “for all” m. Without the supermodularity of the virtual surplus in
11quality, Qm∗(θ,t) may not be nonincreasing in θ for some m. For example, assume that
M = 2, v(q1,q2,t) = q1q2 + t(q1 + q2), c(q1,q2,θ) = (q1 + q2)2 + θ(q1 + ϵq2), ϵ > 0, and
F(θ) = (θ −θ)/(¯ θ −θ) so that the virtual surplus Φ(q1,q2,θ,t) is submodular in (q1,q2).
Then, the optimal quality schedule can be Q1∗(θ,t) = (1/3)[t − (2 − ϵ)(2θ − θ)] and
Q2∗(θ,t) = (1/3)[t−(2ϵ−1)(2θ−θ)], so that Q2∗ is increasing in θ when ϵ < 1/2. Second,
the optimal transfer schedule P ∗
i (,t) may not be increasing in θi. For example, assume
that M = 1, v(q1,t) = tq1, c(q1,θ) = (q1)2 + (θ + 1)q1 + θ, t = 3 and F(θ) = θ. Then,
the optimal quality schedule is Q1∗(θ,t) = 1 − θ, and the critical type is ¯ θt∗ = 2 −
√
3.
Assuming that N = 2, it follows from simple calculations that the transfer schedule
P ∗
i (θ1,θ2,t = 3) is given by
P
∗
i (θ1,θ2,t = 3) = X
∗
i (θ1,θ2,t = 3)
−θ3
i + 9θ2
i − 18θi + 8
3(1 − θi)
.
In this example, provided that X∗
i (θ1,θ2,t = 3) = 1, the transfer is “decreasing” in
θi ∈ [0,2−
√
3]. Thus, the lower cost parameter the supplier has, the higher payment he
can receive in exchange for delivering the product of the higher quality.
In a second step, we examine the implementation of the ex ante optimal mechanism
via a scoring auction. We say that a scoring auction implements the ex ante optimal
mechanism if in the auction game there exists an equilibrium which is outcome-equivalent
to the ex ante optimal mechanism (P ∗
i ,Q∗
i,X∗
i )i∈{1,...,N} for each realization of (,t). The
next proposition states that a scoring auction succeeds in the implementation.
Proposition 1. Suppose that vmm′(q,t) − cmm′(q,θ) ≥ K, for all m ̸= m′. Then: (i)
There exists a quasi-linear scoring rule St∗(p,q) = st(q) − p for each type t with which
a scoring auction implements the ex ante optimal mechanism. (ii) The scoring rule
St∗ has the following properties: st(q) ̸= st′(q) for all t ̸= t′, st(q) ̸= v(q,t), st(q) is
nondecreasing in qm for all m, and st(q) = −∞ if qm < Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t) for some m.
12This proposition is an extension of Che (1993). We discuss several implications. First,
the optimal scoring rule St∗ for each type t diﬀers from the other types. Although in the
ex ante optimal mechanism the buyer is indiﬀerent between revealing and concealing her
true type at the stage of mechanism announcement, the buyer “must” reveal her type
through her announcement of scoring rules. This is because the buyer has no chance to
aﬀect the outcome after the announcement of a scoring rule. The optimal scoring rule
st(q)−p is, however, diﬀerent from her true preference v(q,t)−p. If S(p,q) = v(q,t)−p,
then each supplier i oﬀers the eﬃcient quality level ~ q(θi,t), which is excessive from the
buyer’s viewpoint. Second, the implementation possibilities are positively aﬀected by the
fact that the optimal schedule Qm∗(θ,t) is decreasing in θ for all m. When Qm∗(θ,t) is
increasing in θ for some m as in the example after Lemma 3, a scoring auction may not be
able to implement the ex ante optimal mechanism. Moreover, the monotonicity implies
that the oﬀer qm < Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t) is a signal that a cost parameter is more ineﬃcient than
¯ θt∗. The buyer can thus exclude some ineﬃcient suppliers based on their quality oﬀers.





s(q) − p if p ≤ ¯ p
−∞ if p > ¯ p,
where ¯ p ∈ R+ is a reserve price. With this class of scoring rules, a scoring auction cannot
implement the ex ante optimal mechanism in general. A reserve price excludes eﬃcient
suppliers rather than ineﬃcient suppliers when the transfer schedule P ∗
i (,t) is decreasing
in θi as in the example after Lemma 3.
The scoring rule St∗ = st(q) − p in Proposition 1 seems complicated because the
score of each attribute qm depends on the levels of the other attributes in general (see
Appendix). However, the next proposition shows that a scoring auction with quasi-
13linear rules which are additively separable in (q1,...,qM) implements the ex ante optimal
mechanism with additional conditions.
Proposition 2. Suppose that cmm′ = 0, vmm′ ≥ K, for all m ̸= m′, and the Hessian
of Φ is negative deﬁnite. Then: (i) There exists a quasi-linear scoring rule St∗∗(p,q) =
∑M
m=1 sm,t(qm) − p for each type t with which a scoring auction implements the ex ante
optimal mechanism. (ii) The scoring rule St∗∗ has the following properties: sm,t(qm) ̸=
sm,t′(qm) for all t ̸= t′,
∑M
m=1 sm,t(qm) ̸= v(q,t), sm,t(qm) is nondecreasing in qm, and
sm,t(qm) = −∞ if qm < Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This is a sketch of the proof. See Che (1993).
(i) First, we show that in equilibrium a supplier of type θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS] never submits a
bid (p,q) such that q ̸∈ argmax^ q[s(^ q)−c(^ q,θ)]. Suppose to the contrary that a supplier
of type θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS] submits such a bid (p,q). Now, consider a bid (p′,q′) such that
q′ ∈ argmax^ q[s(^ q) − c(^ q,θ)] and s(q′) − p′ = s(q) − p. The score of (p′,q′) is equal
to that of (p,q), so that both bids yield the same winning probability given the other
suppliers’ strategies. As in Che (1993), we can show that Prob[win | S(p,q)] > 0 for all
θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS). When θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS), the supplier’s expected proﬁt from (p,q) is lower than his
expected proﬁt from (p′,q′) because
[p − c(q,θ)]Prob[win | S(p,q)]
< [p − c(q,θ) + (s(q
′) − c(q






the inequality follows from the fact that q ̸∈ argmax^ q[s(^ q)−c(^ q,θ)] ∋ q′, and the equality
14follows from the construction of (p′,q′). This is a contradiction because the supplier of
type θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS) has a proﬁtable deviation. When θ = ¯ θS, we can show that the bid
(p,q) is weakly dominated by (p′,q′), by the same logic as above. This contradicts the
assumption that no supplier uses weakly dominated strategies. Therefore, we can assume
without loss of generality that the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is given by
(p,q∗) which satisﬁes q∗(θ,S) ∈ argmaxq[s(q) − c(q,θ)] for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS].
Second, consider the following change of variables: k(θ) ≡ s(q∗(θ,S))−c(q∗(θ,S),θ)
and b ≡ s(q∗(θ,S)) − p for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS]. Now, k(θ) = s(q∗(θ,S)) − c(q∗(θ,S),θ) ≥
s(q∗(θ′,S)) − c(q∗(θ′,S),θ) > s(q∗(θ′,S)) − c(q∗(θ′,S),θ′) = k(θ′) for all θ < θ′. Hence,
k(θ) is decreasing in θ, so that the inverse of k exists. Moreover, k(θ) = maxq[s(q) −
c(q,θ)] is continuous in θ by Berge’s maximum theorem with the continuity of s(·) and
c(·). Let β : [k(¯ θS),k(θ)] → R+ denote a symmetric bidding strategy of k(θ) that is
increasing in k. When the other suppliers follow this strategy β, the expected proﬁt of








We can then rely on the technique of ﬁrst-price auction with a boundary condition k(¯ θS) =
β(k(¯ θS)).
(ii) Because k(θ) is decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θS] and the bidding strategy β(k) is increasing
in k, a supplier wins only if his cost parameter is the lowest among (θ1,...,θN) and lower
than ¯ θS.
Proof of Lemma 2. This is a sketch of the proof.
(a) We can show that the necessary and suﬃcient condition for each supplier’s IC
constraint (2) is given by the following two conditions: the envelope condition and the
15monotonicity condition. We say that a direct mechanism ρ = (Pi,Qi,Xi)i∈{1,...,N} satisﬁes

















i(θi | θi). We say that a direct mechanism ρ = (Pi,Qi,Xi)i∈{1,...,N}
















if both Xi(θi,−i,t) and Qi(θi,−i,t) are nonincreasing in θi for all −i and t, then this
condition is automatically satisﬁed.
(b) We solve the optimization problem for the ex ante optimal mechanism. The
supplier’s IC constraint (2) implies that Π
ρ






i | θi) ≥ Π
ρ
i(θ′
i) for all θi < θ′
i. Hence, the supplier’s IR constraint (3) is replaced
by Π
ρ
i(¯ θ) = 0. Using the result (i), the IC constraint (2) and the IR constraint (3) is










dG(t) for all i and θi.
At ﬁrst, we ignore the monotonicity condition and the buyer’s IC constraint (1).
Substituting the supplier’s proﬁt Π
ρ


























16This objective function is maximized when Qi(,t) and Xi(,t) are respectively given
by Q∗(θi,t) and X∗
i (,t) in the lemma. This is because Q∗(θi,t) maximizes Φ(q,θi,t)
and the maximized value is decreasing in θi. The latter follows from Φ(Q∗(θ,t),θ,t) ≥
Φ(Q∗(θ′,t),θ,t) > Φ(Q∗(θ′,t),θ′,t) for all θ < θ′; the second inequality follows from the
assumption that cθθ ≥ 0 and F/f is increasing in θ.
Finally, we show that the direct mechanism ρ∗ = (P ∗
i ,Q∗
i,X∗
i )i∈{1,...,N} satisﬁes the
ignored constraints. It is easy to show that X∗
i is increasing in θi. Now, Φ(q,θi,t) is
supermodular in q by the assumption of the lemma, and has strictly increasing diﬀerences
in (q,−θi) from Assumptions 3, 4 and 5. It then follows from Topkis monotonicity
theorem that Q∗(θi,t) ≥ Q∗(θ′
i,t) for all θi < θ′
i. Thus, this direct mechanism ρ∗ satisﬁes



































the inequality follows from the fact that Q∗(θi,t) ∈ argmaxq Φ(q,θi,t) and the construc-
tion of X∗
i (,t). Therefore, the buyer of type t cannot beneﬁt from reporting ˆ t ̸= t.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, Q∗(θ,t) ≥ Q∗(θ′,t) for all
θ < θ′.
(ii) Lemma 2 states that Q∗(θ,t) ∈ argmaxq Φ(q,θ,t). Now, Φ(q,θ,t) = v(q,t) −
c(q,θ)−cθ(q,θ)F(θ)/f(θ) = v(q,t)−c(q,θ) because F(θ) = 0. Hence, Q∗(θ,t), ~ q(θ,t) ∈
argmaxq[v(q,t) − c(q,θ)].
(iii) Deﬁne the function v(q,t) − c(q,θ) − (1 − a)cθ(q,θ)F(θ)/f(θ) where a ∈ {0,1}.
17This function is supermodular in q because both v−c and Φ are supermodular in q, and
has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (q,a) from Assumptions 3, 4, and 5. It then follows
from Topkis monotonicity theorem that Q∗(θ,t) ≤ ~ q(θ,t). If there exists an attribute m
such that Qm∗(θ,t) = ˜ qm(θ,t), then
0 = Φm(Q
∗(θ,t),θ,t) ≤ Φm(~ q(θ,t),θ,t) < vm(~ q(θ,t),t) − cm(~ q(θ,t),θ) = 0;
the ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption that Φ is supermodular in q, together
with the fact that Q∗(θ,t) ≤ ~ q(θ,t) and Qm∗(θ,t) = ˜ qm(θ,t), and the second inequality
follows from the assumption that cmθ > 0. This is a contradiction, which implies that
Q∗(θ,t) ≪ ~ q(θ,t) for all θ ∈ (θ, ¯ θ].
Proof of Proposition 1. For each qm ∈ [Qm∗(¯ θ,t),Qm∗(θ,t)], let θm,t(qm) be a cost param-
eter which satisﬁes Φm(qm,Q−m∗(θ,t),θ,t) = 0; given t, θm,t(qm) is uniquely determined
by this equation because the left-hand side is monotonic in θ, i.e. Φm(qm,Q−m∗(θ,t),θ,t) >







σt(max{θ1,t(q1),...,θM,t(qM)}) if qm ≥ Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t) for all m
−∞ if qm < Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t) for some m,
where σt(·) is constructed as follows. It follows from Lemma 1 that a supplier of type
θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θt∗] chooses quality q which maximizes st(q) − c(q,θ). Then, his problem is
reduced to max^ θ∈[θ, θt∗] σt(ˆ θ) − c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ) from the construction of st(q). His produc-
tion cost c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ) has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in (θ, ˆ θ) because c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ)−
c(Q∗(ˆ θ′,t),θ) < c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ′) − c(Q∗(ˆ θ′,t),θ′) for all θ < θ′ and ˆ θ < ˆ θ′; the inequality
follows from the part (i) of Lemma 3 and the assumption that cmθ > 0.
Now, consider a family of curves {σ = c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ) + h(θ)} parametrized by θ ∈
18[θ, ¯ θt∗], where h(θ) is given by





h(θ) is an arbitrary real number which is suﬃciently high. Then, let σt(ˆ θ) be the lower
envelope of {σ = c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ) + h(θ)}, which is given by
σ
t(ˆ θ) = c(Q
∗(ˆ θ,t), ˆ θ) + h(ˆ θ).
Since this lower envelope is tangent to σ = c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ) + h(θ) at ˆ θ = θ, the supplier of
type θ optimally chooses ˆ θ = θ to maximize σt(ˆ θ) − c(Q∗(ˆ θ,t),θ). Hence, q∗(θ,St∗) =
Q∗(θ,t).
It follows from Lemma 1 that in equilibrium each supplier i pays the same price as
P ∗
i (,t) for each realization of (,t).
Finally, the buyer of type t has no incentive to deviate from announcing St∗ because
it also implements the optimal mechanism when the buyer’s realized type is common
knowledge.
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if qm ∈ (Qm∗(θ,t),∞)
−∞ if qm ∈ [0,Qm∗(¯ θt∗,t)).
Second, we show that the unique maximizer of
∑M
m=1 sm(qm,t) − c(q,θ) is equal to

















19which is satisﬁed if qm = Qm∗(θ,t) for all m. Now, we show that the Hessian of
∑M
m=1 sm(qm,t)−c(q,θ) is negative deﬁnite, and thus
∑M
m=1 sm(qm,t)−c(q,θ) is strictly
concave in q. The second-order derivative of
∑M



































































The assumption cmm′ = 0 for all m ̸= m′, together with the supermodularity of Φ,
implies that vmm′ − cmm′θ
F
f ≥ 0. Thus, the above second-order derivative is less than
zero, so that all the diagonal elements of the Hessian of
∑M
m=1 sm(qm,t) − c(q,θ) are
negative. The oﬀ-diagonal element is given by −cmm′ = 0 for m ̸= m′, so that the Hessian
of
∑M
m=1 sm(qm,t) − c(q,θ) is negative deﬁnite. Lemma 1 implies that q∗(θ,St∗∗) ∈
argmaxq∈Q [
∑M
m=1 sm,t(qm) − c(q,θ)]. Hence, q∗(θ,St∗∗) = Q∗(θ,t).
It follows from Lemma 1 that in equilibrium each supplier i pays the same price as
P ∗
i (,t) for each realization of (,t).
Finally, the buyer of type t has no incentive to deviate from announcing St∗∗ because
it also implements the optimal mechanism when the buyer’s realized type is common
knowledge.
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